Abstract: A secure and efficient mobile IP (MIP) registration protocol using certificateless signature scheme is proposed. The protocol minimises the registration time through minimal usage of an efficient certificateless signature scheme between a foreign agent (FA) and a home agent (HA). Protocol parameters can be kept resynchronised by reusing the initial values in the MIP registration in case the synchronisation between a mobile node (MN) and HA is lost. User anonymity is achieved via a temporary identity transmitted by a mobile user, instead of its true identity. Additional replay protection from the FA is included in the registration messages to prevent a possible replay attack. Numerical results and performance analyses demonstrate that the proposed protocol outperforms the existing ones in terms of the registration time, registration signalling traffic and computational load on an MN while providing improved security. For example, the proposed protocol reduces the registration time up to 83% compared with the protocol from Yang. As a form of remote redirection that involves all the mobility entities, the registration part of the MIP is very crucial and must be guarded against any malicious attacks [3] that might try to take illegitimate advantages from any participating principals. Excessive security may cause too long registration time, especially for real-time services. Therefore for the wide deployment of MIP, MIP registration must have as good a performance as possible while providing a certain level of security, for example, authentication, integrity, replay protection, secure distribution of session keys, confidentiality and anonymity. This paper is concerned with the security aspect of MIP registration, taking the efficiency into account. Currently, the basic MIP protocol [1, 2] relies on the use of manual symmetric keys for the authentication of its control messages. This approach is not scalable enough to support many users. To improve the scalability, the certificate-based public key infrastructure (CA-PKI) is used for authentication among three mobility entities [4 -6]; however, the proposals have a requirement on a mode node (MN) to perform heavy certificate-based public key cryptography operations. Afterwards, other registration protocols [7 -11] were proposed, which employ only the minimal use of the certificate-based public keys between a foreign agent (FA) and a home agent (HA) to avoid the drawback; nevertheless, their registration time is still somewhat long because of the certificate-based operations that are involved. Besides these mainstream research works, there are other techniques in the works [4, 12 -14], such as IPSec, GSM and one-way function, introduced into MIP, which cannot give attention to both the security and efficiency. To acquire a better performance, recently, research works in [15, 16] employ the identity (ID)-based public key cryptography (ID-PKC), attempting to exclude the time-consuming certificate operations (e.g. certificate revocation list (CRL) retrieval and certificate validation); however, the ID-based MIP registration protocols inherit the inborn key escrow [17] from the ID-PKC, which weakens the security of MIP. Therefore our concept grew out of a search for a new paradigm of public key cryptography that does not require the use of certificates to guarantee the authenticity of public keys and does not have the key escrow problem. Our solution is certificateless-public key cryptography (CL-PKC) [17] . Besides, location privacy and anonymity service in MIP has been considered in [11, [18] [19][20], which was previously discussed for wireless networks in [21 -23]. To address these problems, in this paper, we propose a novel MIP registration protocol based on CL-PKC, balancing the security and efficiency. This paper makes four major features: (1) the efficient certificateless signature (CLS) scheme [24] is applied to the authentications between FA and HA to minimise the registration time; (2) parameter resynchronisation can be attained by reusing the initial values in MIP registration in case synchronisation is lost; (3) user's anonymity is achieved by letting an MN transmit a temporary identity (TID) [25, 26] instead of its true identity; (4) the proposed protocols employ the nonces from the MN, HA and FA to #
Introduction
There are two major technological forces that drive the communication era: wireless evolutionary systems and the Internet. The success of mobile wireless networks and growth of Internet services lead to an increasing demand for mobile wireless access to the Internet. Mobile IP (MIP) [1, 2] (Fig. 1 ), which is developed by the IETF, aims to provide mobility support within the Internet. With the convergence of wireless and IP technology, MIP gives a simple and scalable global mobility solution for different networks in the future all-IP mobile communication system. As a form of remote redirection that involves all the mobility entities, the registration part of the MIP is very crucial and must be guarded against any malicious attacks [3] that might try to take illegitimate advantages from any participating principals. Excessive security may cause too long registration time, especially for real-time services. Therefore for the wide deployment of MIP, MIP registration must have as good a performance as possible while providing a certain level of security, for example, authentication, integrity, replay protection, secure distribution of session keys, confidentiality and anonymity. This paper is concerned with the security aspect of MIP registration, taking the efficiency into account. Currently, the basic MIP protocol [1, 2] relies on the use of manual symmetric keys for the authentication of its control messages. This approach is not scalable enough to support many users. To improve the scalability, the certificate-based public key infrastructure (CA-PKI) is used for authentication among three mobility entities [4 -6] ; however, the proposals have a requirement on a mode node (MN) to perform heavy certificate-based public key cryptography operations. Afterwards, other registration protocols [7 -11] were proposed, which employ only the minimal use of the certificate-based public keys between a foreign agent (FA) and a home agent (HA) to avoid the drawback; nevertheless, their registration time is still somewhat long because of the certificate-based operations that are involved. Besides these mainstream research works, there are other techniques in the works [4, 12 -14] , such as IPSec, GSM and one-way function, introduced into MIP, which cannot give attention to both the security and efficiency. To acquire a better performance, recently, research works in [15, 16] employ the identity (ID)-based public key cryptography (ID-PKC), attempting to exclude the time-consuming certificate operations (e.g. certificate revocation list (CRL) retrieval and certificate validation); however, the ID-based MIP registration protocols inherit the inborn key escrow [17] from the ID-PKC, which weakens the security of MIP. Therefore our concept grew out of a search for a new paradigm of public key cryptography that does not require the use of certificates to guarantee the authenticity of public keys and does not have the key escrow problem. Our solution is certificateless-public key cryptography (CL-PKC) [17] . Besides, location privacy and anonymity service in MIP has been considered in [11, [18] [19] [20] , which was previously discussed for wireless networks in [21 -23] . To address these problems, in this paper, we propose a novel MIP registration protocol based on CL-PKC, balancing the security and efficiency. This paper makes four major features: (1) the efficient certificateless signature (CLS) scheme [24] is applied to the authentications between FA and HA to minimise the registration time; (2) parameter resynchronisation can be attained by reusing the initial values in MIP registration in case synchronisation is lost; (3) user's anonymity is achieved by letting an MN transmit a temporary identity (TID) [25, 26] instead of its true identity; (4) the proposed protocols employ the nonces from the MN, HA and FA to prevent all possible replay attacks. Numerical results and performance analyses demonstrate that the proposed protocol outperforms the existing ones in terms of registration time, registration signalling traffic and computational load on an MN while improving security. In particular, compared with Yang's protocol [11] , the proposed protocol reduces the registration time up to 83% while offering stronger security.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, the certificateless signature scheme and replay protection using nonces are reviewed, and it is discussed that a possible replay attack shall succeed if the registration does not include FA's replay protection. Section 3 presents the new CLS-based MIP registration protocol with user anonymity. Security and performance analyses are given in Sections 4 and 5, respectively. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
Preliminaries
This section covers the certificateless signature scheme and replay protection using nonces, on which to base the proposed protocol, and a possible replay attack, which is considered in the proposed protocol, is discussed.
Certificateless signature scheme
The concept of CL-PKC was first introduced by Al-Riyami and Paterson [17] in 2003. Many certificateless signature schemes [17, 24, [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] have been proposed since CL-PKC was introduced in the literature. The CLS scheme in [24] is more efficient than those in [17, [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] because of less pairing computations and shorter public keys. The CLS scheme is probably secure [24] under the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption constructed by the following seven algorithms.
Setup: Given the security parameter k, the algorithm works as follows: (a) Run LG [17] to output descriptions of groups G 1 and G 2 of prime order q and a pairing e: 
as the signature of m. Verify: Given signature d, ID A , m and P A , the algorithm works as follows:
that is, by verifying whether e(P, V ) ¼ e(P 0 þ P A , U þ hQ A ). If not, reject the signature, else accept it.
In a CLS, Setup and Set-Partial-Private-Key are performed by a key generation centre (KGC). A partial private key D A is given to a user A by the KGC through a secure channel. CLS can avoid the inherent key escrow problem, which is suffered by IBS since Set-Secret-value, Set-Private-Key and Set-Public-Key are executed by the user A itself.
Replay protection using nonces
In order to prevent a replay attack on the registration, MIP specifies two methods to ensure the freshness of the registration between MN and HA. The first method is based on timestamps, and the second method uses nonces. We choose nonces in the proposed protocol because nonces are self-synchronising [1, 2] and two nodes with nonces only need the pseudo-random number generators. However, two nodes using timestamps must have adequately synchronised time-of-day clocks and require clock resynchronisation in case the timestamp is not valid [33] .
The basic principle of nonces is that an MN includes a new pseudo-random number as the nonce in every request to its HA and requires the HA to return the same nonce in its reply. At the same time, every reply sent by the HA to the MN also includes the HA's nonce to be echoed later by the MN in the next request. If the HA rejects the request because of an invalid HA's nonce, the reply always provides the MN with a new nonce to be used in the next registration request [1, 2, 7] .
Possible replay attack on registration
In the basic MIP registration protocol (Fig. 2) [1, 2] , an FA relays an MN's registration request message with the MN -HA authentication extension to an HA, and also relays the HA's registration reply message with the MN -HA authentication extension to the MN. There is a possible replay attack when the protocol includes only the nonces from MN and HA. An attacker first records a valid request [the message of (1) in Fig. 2 ] and its corresponding reply [the message of (3) in Fig. 2 ] from some previous runs of a successful registration. Then the attacker intercepts the message sent by the MN and the HA and replays the valid recorded messages of (1) and (3); the FA still believes that the registration is a one generated by a legitimate MN and HA. Therefore the attacker spoofs the FA and can use the resources on the FA's local network. Essentially, this attack works because no replay protection from the FA is employed in the protocol. Hence this attack can be prevented, simply by including additional nonce from the FA [7, 8, 11, 34] in the registration message.
3
Proposed CLS-based MIP registration protocol with user anonymity 3.1 Notations Table 1 presents the notations used in this paper.
Design principles
Design principles in the proposed protocol [7, 10, 14, 35] are: † achieving a certain level of security, for example, authentication, integrity, replay protection, secure distribution of session keys, confidentiality and user anonymity; † minimising the registration time for high efficiency; † off-computing suitable values to reduce processing time; † minimising the computational load imposed on an MN, because it is a mobile device, which has limited computational power and memory. † minimising the message size and the number of message exchanges in order to save the bandwidth of networks.
Protocol description
An FA or HA in the MIP system employs CL-PKI, in which its public key is P FA or P HA and its private key is S FA or S HA , respectively. The IP source address field and MN's home address field [1] of the registration request message should be 0 since a dynamic home address assignment shall be adopted to conceal identity-related data of MN [36] . There are three steps in MIP: MN initialisation, MN registration and tunnelling.
Mobile node initialisation in the MIP system:
When an MN is added to the MIP system, the new node's HA first verifies the node's identity ID MN 3.3.2 Mobile node registration with its HA in the MIP system: When the MN moves to a foreign network, it must register the location binding information with its HA. Fig. 3 shows the proposed MIP registration protocol that proceeds as follows. 
Tunnelling:
The MN uses the tunnelling technique to receive data after the location registration.
Security analyses and comparisons
In this section, security analyses of the proposed protocol are provided prior to the comparisons with the existing protocols. We compare the proposed protocol with the basic protocol [1, 2] , CA-PKI based protocol [5] and Yang's protocol [11] because they stand for three main types of the existing registration protocols, that is, secret-key based one, CA-PKI based one and a hybrid technique of secret-key and CA-PKI.
Security analyses

Mutual authentications between three entities in MIP:
The mutual authentications between an MN and an HA are achieved in R4 and R8 by validating kM 2 lK MN -HA and kM 5 lK MN -HA , respectively. Also, the authentications between an FA and an HA are accomplished in R4 and R6 by using the CLS scheme. Note that the trust relations between the MN and FA are established through the HA.
Integrity:
If an attacker alters the registration messages between an FA and an HA, the signature verification will fail because of the property of the hash function in the CLS scheme, and the verifier (HA or FA) can know the message has been modified. Also, kM 2 lK MN -HA and kM 5 lK MN -HA can ensure the integrity of the registration messages between the MN and HA.
Replay protection:
If an attacker replays a registration request that has been previously accepted by an HA, the HA will reject it when the N HA in the request message is not equal to the last nonce issued by the HA. Also, N MN can provide replay protection for reply messages. As we mentioned in Section 2.3, registration messages that include the nonce from FA can prevent another possible replay attack. Therefore the registration messages including N MN , N HA and N FA can prevent all replay attacks.
Secure distribution of secret keys after one registration:
It is a potential source of weakness if the same secret keys are used for a long time. Therefore two dynamic secret keys K 0 MN -HA and K MN -FA can be generated by an HA according to (1) and (2). Moreover, K 0 MN -HA and K MN -FA are computed locally by an MN, rather than transmitted to the MN by the HA over links, which means higher grade of security [37] . The dynamic secret key between the FA and HA is generated as follows. In the proposed protocol, the above problem can be solved by the following scheme. In the beginning, an MN constructs the registration request message with (ID MN 
Comparisons with the existing protocols
Some failures in Yang's protocol [11] are as follows: (1) user anonymity cannot be provided because the identity-related data of an MN is transmitted together with the corresponding cipher-text; (2) symmetric encryptions cannot provide the convincing mutual authentications between the MN and HA; (3) no scheme is proposed to solve the synchronisation problem. Table 2 shows the authentication analysis of three previous protocols and the proposed protocol. The replay protection method and attack prevent analysis are listed in Table 3 . Also, the cryptanalysis is shown in Table 4 .
From the analyses and comparisons above, the proposed protocol achieves a higher level of security than the three existing ones.
5
Performance evaluation and comparisons
Numerical results
The values for the system parameters are directly obtained from previous works [41, 42] . The hardware platform for the FA and HA is a Pentium 4 2. Fig. 4 shows the comparison result of these three protocols in terms of the registration time. Compared with Yang's protocol [11] , the registration time of the proposed protocol is reduced up to 83% for two main reasons: (1) the proposed protocol eliminates certificate-based operations; (2) K 0 MN -HA and K MN -FA are not transmitted by an HA to an MN but generated locally by the MN, which saves the time spent in transmitting these two keys over links and encrypting/decrypting them on the HA and MN. Note that the registration time of the proposed protocol has not drastically decreased because of the involved bilinear pairing operations. It can be seen that the proposed protocol takes a little more time than the basic protocol [1, 2] because the former provides much stronger security.
Registration signalling traffic:
The message size of these three compared protocols is listed in Table 6 . Compared with Yang's protocol [11] , this is certainly true with regard to the savings in the communication bandwidth between an FA and an HA because of the much smaller message size in the proposed protocol. Only the message from the MN to FA of the proposed protocol is a little larger than that of Yang's protocol [11] because of the improved security. It is observed that there are the smallest message sizes in the basic protocol since it offers the weakest security. Therefore the proposed protocol has less registration signalling traffic while providing stronger security.
Computational load on an MN:
The basic protocol [1, 2] only runs two SHA on an MN since it keeps the lowest level of security, Yang's protocol [11] runs nine DES on an MN and the proposed protocol only does three SHA and one DES operations on the MN. Thus, the proposed protocol can reduce the computational load on the MN while improving security.
To summarise, the proposed protocol outperforms the existing protocols in terms of the registration time, registration signalling traffic and computational load on an MN, while providing improved security.
6
Conclusions and future work This paper introduces the CLS scheme into MIP registration to minimise registration time while offering scalability and security. Parameter resynchronisation is attained by reusing the initial values in MIP registration in case synchronisation is lost. User anonymity is achieved via a TID transmitted by an MN, instead of its true identity. In addition, all possible replay attacks can be prevented by using the nonces from the MN, HA and FA. From the security and performance analyses, the proposed protocol is superior to the existing protocols. It can be concluded that the proposed protocol has been guided by the design principles in Section 3.2 to make it more secure and efficient. One future work is to search for the CLS schemes without pairing to be applied into MIP registration for higher efficiency; another research topic is to study how to make concrete the proposed MIP protocol in different wireless networks, such as WLAN, CDMA, 3G and beyond 3G mobile networks. In addition, we may consider how to integrate the proposed MIP registration protocol with AAA for its flexible mobility on different administrative domains.
